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UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE REVISED 
UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT 
 
Russell K. Smith* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 28, 2011, Governor Gary R. Herbert signed into law S.B. 131, the 
Unincorporated Business Entity Uniform Acts, which included a modified version 
of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA). The modified 
version of RULLCA included in S.B. 131 has been further modified in S.B. 21
1
 to 
make certain corrective and harmonized changes (the Proposed Act). It is the basic 
premise of this Article that the Proposed Act will provide a number of valuable 
improvements for businesses formed as limited liability companies (LLCs)  
in Utah. 
This Article begins with a brief history of the evolution of LLC acts. Next, it 
reviews the current state of law relative to Utah LLCs, with a particular focus on 
potentially problematic provisions in our existing LLC Act. It then provides a 
general overview of certain provisions of the Proposed Act, paying particular 
attention to problematic issues associated with Utah’s existing LLC Act. 
 
II.  EVOLUTION OF LLC ACTS 
 
Since Wyoming passed the first LLC Act in 1977, the LLC has grown to be a 
favored form of business entity, not only in Utah, but throughout the nation. By the 
end of 1996, all of the states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted 
LLC acts. 
During the LLC “explosion” of the early 1990s, a working group of the 
American Bar Association’s Committee on LLCs, Partnerships, and 
Unincorporated Entities (LPUE) drafted and in 1992 published the Prototype 
Limited Liability Company Act (the Prototype Act) to provide guidance for the 
analysis and resolution of issues involved in crafting LLC legislation. Shortly 
thereafter, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) began working on a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(ULLCA) and finalized an initial version in 1994. Both the Prototype Act and the 
ULLCA were influential as various states drafted and modified their LLC acts, but 
neither fully occupied the field. In addition to the Prototype Act and the ULLCA, 
state legislative bodies have looked to NCCUSL’s Uniform Partnership Act and 
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act for guidance in connection with adopting and 
amending their LLC acts. As a result, LLC acts vary considerably in both form and 
substance from state to state. 
                                                 
* © 2013 Russell K. Smith. Reviewed by Mark Astling. 
1
 S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2013/ 
bills/static/SB0021.html (sponsored by L. Hillyard). 
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On January 1, 1997, the Internal Revenue Service repealed its Kintner 
regulations,
2
 which provided for classification of business entities as partnerships 
or corporations for tax purposes based on the existence or lack thereof of certain 
corporate characteristics (i.e., limited liability, centralized management, free 
transferability of interest, and continuity of life), and replaced them with the 
“check-the-box” regulations.
3
 Prior to the repeal of the Kintner regulations, many 
LLC acts were drafted as so-called bulletproof statutes. Such bulletproof LLC acts 
ensured that LLCs formed under them would always be classified as partnerships 
for federal tax purposes, because any such LLC would always lack the corporate 
characteristics of continuity of life and free transferability of interests. 
In response to the adoption of the check-the-box regulations, the ULLCA was 
revised and many states amended their LLC acts to remove the outdated provisions 
relating to the Kintner regulations. In addition, as the LLC structure has grown to 
become the favored form of business and investment entity, states have further 
amended their LLC acts to deal with emerging issues such as single-member 
LLCs, series within an LLC, shelf LLCs, subsidiary-style LLCs, and conversions 
and domestications. For example, single-member LLCs, once suspect because of 
their novelty and uncertain tax status, are now popular both for sole proprietorships 
and as corporate subsidiaries. 
As a result of the changing legal landscape, in the early 2000s, LPUE 
undertook to update the Prototype Act and NCCUSL initiated a project to amend 
and update the ULLCA. LPUE published the Revised Prototype Limited Liability 
Company Act (the Revised Prototype Act) in the November 2011 issue of The 
Business Lawyer.
4
 In 2006, NCCUSL approved and recommended the RULLCA 
for enactment in all states. The members of the drafting committees of the 
RULLCA and the Revised Prototype Act include practicing lawyers, judges, 
legislators, and law professors who are some of the nation’s most knowledgeable 
and well-versed experts in LLC issues and drafting legislation. Since the approval 
of the RULLCA, NCCUSL has undertaken to harmonize the RULLCA and the 
other unincorporated business entities statutes (i.e., the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (RUPA) and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA 
(2001))). In 2011, NCCUSL approved and recommended for enactment in all 
states the harmonized versions of RULLCA (HRULLCA), RUPA (HRUPA) and 
ULPA (2001) (HULPA). 
                                                 
2
 Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) 
(codified at Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (2012)). 
3
 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3. Widely known as the “check-the-box” regulations, 
these regulations provide that most multiowner unincorporated business forms (including 
multimember LLCs) will be taxed as partnerships, and single-owner unincorporated 
business forms (including single-member LLCs) will be disregarded for tax purposes, 
unless a specific election is made to have them taxed as corporations. Id. 
4
 Revised Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act Editorial Bd., LLCs, P’ships & 
Unincorporated Entities Comm., Am. Bar. Ass’n Section of Bus. Law, Revised Prototype 
Limited Liability Company Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 117 (2011). 
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III.  UTAH’S LLC ACT 
 
Utah enacted its first LLC statute in 1991 and, after several revisions, the 
entire statute was replaced in 2001 with the Utah Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act (the Current Act). The Current Act consists of provisions taken from 
a variety of sources including the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the 
Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the Utah LP Act), the Utah 
Professional Corporation Act, the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act, the 
Prototype Act, the ULLCA, and the LLC statutes of California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, Virginia, and 
Washington. As a result, the Current Act is a hodge-podge statute unlike any other 
LLC statute—indeed, one member of the ABA’s drafting committee for the 
Revised Prototype Act has referred to it as a “Frankenstein” statute.
5
 
In what is supposed to be a business-friendly state, Utah has an LLC statute 
that has certain outdated and antibusiness features including: (1) limited life (i.e., 
no perpetual life), (2) a one-of-a-kind liquidation proceeds waterfall that penalizes 
member-creditors and winding-up creditors by subordinating their claims to the 
claims of other creditors, (3) statutory reformation of the members’ business deal if 
not in a signed writing, which disproportionately disadvantages the unsophisticated 
and unrepresented, (4) inflexible management structure and delegation of 
authority, (5) limited member asset protection features, (6) default profit/loss 
allocation and distribution rules that do not take into account “profits interests” and 
which, in certain circumstances, will conflict with federal tax rules, and  
(7) a default requirement for a unanimous vote on all matters to be decided by the 
vote of the managers. 
For purposes of this Article, whether an LLC statute is business friendly is 
taken from the perspective of the LLC and its members and management, as 
opposed to third parties doing business with the LLC (e.g., creditors). The 
business-friendly definition includes such things as ease of formation, ongoing 
compliance obligations, and giving maximum effect to the concept of freedom of 
contract (i.e., the ability of individuals to make a legally binding agreement 
without governmental interference). 
 
A.  LLC Duration Is Unnecessarily Limited to a Maximum of Ninety-Nine Years 
 
While almost all LLC statutes now permit LLCs to have a perpetual existence 
similar to that of corporations, the Current Act explicitly limits the duration of an 
LLC formed under the Current Act to ninety-nine years from the date when the 
LLC’s articles of organization were filed or the later of any amendments to the 
articles of organization effecting a change in the duration.
6
 This durational limit is 
an outdated remnant of the old Kintner regulations, and its sole function was 
                                                 
5
 PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE UTAH LLC ACT (2011), available at 
http://www.utahbar.org/cle/springconvention/materials/H_outline.pdf. 
6
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-403(4)(c) (West Supp. 2012). 
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intended to ensure that an LLC qualified for partnership tax treatment. In response 
to the check-the-box regulations, most state LLC statutes were amended to permit 
perpetual-duration LLCs. Utah has not modified its statute to reflect the evolution 
in tax classification by the check-the-box regulations. In contrast, the Utah LP Act 
was amended post-check-the-box regulations to remove this outdated limit on 
duration and permit perpetual duration of limited partnerships.
7
 While the 
members of an LLC may choose to have an LLC of limited duration, no sound 
policy reason exists to statutorily limit the duration of LLCs. 
 
B.  Utah’s One-of-a-Kind Liquidation Proceeds Waterfall  
Penalizes Member-Creditors and Winding-Up Creditors  
by Subordinating Their Claims 
 
Unlike any other LLC act, the Current Act penalizes member-creditors and 
winding-up creditors by subordinating their claims to the claims of other creditors 
during the liquidation and winding-up process. Such subordination is neither 
warranted nor justified and runs contrary to other Utah creditor-rights statutes. 
The Current Act, like other LLC acts, provides that a member of an LLC may 
transact business with the LLC and, subject to such laws as may be applicable, 
“shall have the rights and obligations with respect to any such matter as a person 
who is not a member.”
8
 These provisions recognize not only that members of 
LLCs often wear many different hats (e.g., creditor, lessor, guarantor, employee, 
etc.), but also that members of LLCs frequently transact business with the LLCs, 
and the members of the LLC should not be penalized for engaging in  
such transactions. 
A member may become a creditor of an LLC in a variety of ways. In practice, 
members often (i) lend money (either secured or unsecured) to the LLC, 
(ii) provide services to the LLC for which the member is to receive remuneration, 
(iii) sell goods to the LLC on credit, (iv) receive indemnification payments from 
the LLC, (v) pay LLC expenses on behalf of the LLC for which the member will 
be reimbursed, and (vi) lease real or personal property to the LLC. 
Each LLC statute establishes a priority of asset distribution in connection with 
the winding up of an LLC’s business. Typically, an LLC’s assets are first applied 
or set aside to satisfy an LLC’s obligations to creditors in the order of priority as 
provided by law (i.e., first to secured creditors based on priority and then to 
unsecured creditors based on priority). It is only after creditors have been paid or 
otherwise provided for that any remaining assets are distributed to the members in 
respect of their LLC interests. 
Business-friendly LLC acts do not distinguish between nonmember-creditors 
and member-creditors with respect to priority of liquidating distributions. The fact 
that a person is a member does not alter any rights that such person may have as a 
creditor. For example, the Delaware LLC Act provides that upon the winding up of 
                                                 
7
 Id. § 48-2a-201(1)(d)(i). 
8
 Id. § 48-2c-119. 
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a Delaware LLC, the LLC’s assets are to be distributed as follows: (1) to creditors, 
including members and managers who are creditors, to the extent otherwise 
permitted by law, in satisfaction of liabilities of the LLC, other than liabilities for 
which reasonable provision for payment has been made and liabilities for interim 
and resignation distributions to members and former members; (2) unless 
otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, to members and former members in 
satisfaction of liabilities for interim and resignation distributions; and (3) 
thereafter, to the members.
9
 
In contrast, the Current Act penalizes member-creditors by subordinating their 
creditor interests behind nonmember-creditors in liquidation. Under the Current 
Act, the assets of an LLC are to be applied or distributed as follows: (1) to pay or 
satisfy the liabilities of creditors other than members, in the order of priority as 
provided by law; (2) to pay or satisfy the liabilities to members in their capacity as 
creditors, in the order of priority as provided by law; (3) to pay or satisfy the 
expenses and costs of winding up the LLC; and (4) thereafter, to the members.
10
 
This member-creditor subordination penalty, based solely on the grounds that the 
creditor is a member, is neither warranted nor justified. In fact, this provision is 
inconsistent with other Utah creditor-rights statutes including the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code
11
 and the Utah Real Estate Act,
12
 which provide for different 
payment priorities. 
The Current Act further confuses creditor rights with respect to expenses and 
costs incurred as part of winding up an LLC. The Current Act creates a separate 
class of creditors (the so-called winding-up creditors)—those to whom the 
company owes the costs and expenses of winding up the LLC—and places this 
class of creditors behind, rather than on par with or ahead of, all other creditors 
(both nonmember- and member-creditors).
13
 Accordingly, nonmember-creditors 
such as attorneys, accountants, and employees who assist in the winding up of the 
LLC and suppliers and other consultants who provide goods and services during 
the winding up period of an LLC may have their claims subordinated to all other 
creditors. This provision of the Current Act is a disincentive to persons who might 
otherwise provide goods and services to an LLC that is or might be winding up its 
business. This is especially true in circumstances where the LLC may have 
insufficient assets to pay all of its creditors. Furthermore, such subordination is 
inconsistent with other Utah creditor-rights statutes.
14
 
The Current Act has the dubious distinction of being the only LLC statute that 
creates such an inequitable asset distribution waterfall. In contrast, the Utah LP Act 
does not subordinate partner-creditor or winding-up-creditor claims.
15
 Rather, the 
                                                 
9
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a) (2005). 
10
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308. 
11
 Id. §§ 70A-9a-101 to -709 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
12
 Id. § 57-1-29 (West Supp. 2012). 
13
 Id. § 48-2c-1308(1). 
14
 See id. §§ 70A-9a-101 to -709 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); id. § 57-1-29 (West 
Supp. 2012). 
15
 Id. § 48-2a-804 (West Supp. 2012). 
2013] UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF RULLCA 17 
 
 
Utah LP Act uses the same basic liquidating distribution provision (i.e., first to 
creditors including partner-creditors)
16
 used in states that have business-friendly 









As a word of caution, some practitioners have mistakenly attempted to opt-out 
of the problematic statutory distribution provisions of the Current Act by including 
alternative liquidation distribution provisions in a written operating agreement. In 
fact, many Utah LLC operating agreements, either intentionally or inadvertently, 
contain asset liquidation distribution provisions that purport to remove or alter the 
statutory subordination of member-creditor and winding-up-creditor claims. In 
spite of such proactive drafting, the Current Act nullifies any such modification of 
the statutory distribution provisions without the consent of the nonmember-
creditors. The Current Act specifically provides that a Utah LLC’s articles of 
organization or operating agreement may not “restrict rights of . . . persons other 
than the members, their assignees and transferees, the managers, and the [LLC], 
without the consent of those persons.”
21
 Accordingly, the superior priority rights 
granted to nonmember-creditors under the Current Act may not be restricted 
without such nonmember-creditors’ consent. Therefore, an operating agreement 
that purports to remove or alter the statutory subordination of member-creditor and 
winding-up-creditor claims would be of no force or effect as to nonconsenting, 
nonmember-creditors. 
 
C.  The Current Act Abandons Nearly a Century of Legislative History and 
Disproportionately Disadvantages the Unsophisticated and Unrepresented by 
Prohibiting Oral Operating Agreements 
 
Unlike a majority of LLC acts, the Current Act superimposes a one-size-fits-
all statutory set of business terms in place of informally agreed to business terms 
that have not been memorialized in a written operating agreement. Not only does 
this written requirement abandon nearly a century of legislative history during 
which Utah has recognized both oral partnership agreements and oral operating 
agreements, but it also leads to greater uncertainty and disproportionately 
disadvantages the unsophisticated and unrepresented who are less likely to have 
formal written operating agreements. 
The requirement that an operating agreement be in writing is one of the most 
potentially troublesome provisions of the Current Act. Ironically, it is also one of 
the most misunderstood. The Current Act defines an “operating agreement” as “a 
written agreement of the members . . . concerning the business or purpose of the 
company and the conduct of its affairs.”
22
 The problem with the written 




 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a) (2005). 
18
 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 11.053 (West 2011). 
19
 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.521 (LexisNexis 2010). 
20
 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049 (2011). 
21
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-120(1)(h). 
22
 Id. § 48-2c-102(16) (emphasis added). 
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requirement is that it attempts to legislate a best practice while ignoring certain 
realities. Stated differently, the issue is not whether oral agreements are 
appropriate or whether operating agreements should be in writing—indeed, it 
seems clear that the best practice is to always have members of an LLC 
memorialize their business agreement in writing. Rather, the issue is whether an 
operating agreement must be in writing. 
Recognizing the reality of informal oral agreements, a significant majority of 
jurisdictions,
23
 as well as the RULLCA
24
 and the Revised Prototype Act,
25
 permit 
oral operating agreements. Like many of the jurisdictions that permit oral operating 
                                                 
23
 The following jurisdictions permit oral operating agreements (either explicitly or by 
not requiring a written operating agreement): Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.095 (2010) 
(silent—no written requirement); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601(14) (Supp. 
2011); California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 17001(ab) (West 2006); Colorado, COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 7-80-102(11) (2012); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-101(17) (West 
Supp. 2012); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 2010); District of 
Columbia, D.C. CODE § 29-801.02(10) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 608.402(24) (West 2007); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(18) (Supp. 2012); 
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-101 (LexisNexis 2008) (silent—no written 
requirement); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-102(15) (Supp. 2012); Illinois, 805 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5 (West 2010) (silent, except for single-member LLCs, which 
must have written operating agreements unless they are managed by a person other than the 
member); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-1-16 (LexisNexis 2010); Kansas, KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-7663(g) (2007); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.015(20) (West Supp. 
2011) (except certain single-member LLCs); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12:1301(16) (Supp. 2012) (except single-member LLCs); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, 
§ 1502(15) (2011); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-402(b)(2) (West 
Supp. 2012); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 2(9) (LexisNexis 2005); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.03(6) (West 2011) (silent—no written requirement); 
Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-105(t) (Supp. 2011); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 347.015(13) (West 2001) (except single-member LLCs); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-8-102(23) (2011) (silent—no written requirement); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-102(14) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.101 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (no written requirement, but must be evidenced in tangible or 
electronic format); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-03(16) (2011); North Dakota, 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-02(8) (2012) (silent—no written requirement); Ohio, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1705.01(J) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (except single-member LLCs); 
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001(16) (West 2012); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 63.001(25) (2011); Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8916 (West Supp. 2012); 
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2(21) (Supp. 2011); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-44-103(a) (2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-101(12) (2007); 
Texas, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.001(1) (West Supp. 2012); Vermont, VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(15) (2012) (no written requirement, but must be evidenced in tangible 
or electronic format); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1023 (Supp. 2012); West Virginia, 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-1-103 (LexisNexis 2009); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-29-102(xiv) (2011). 
24
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(13) (2006). 
25
 REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(14) (2011). 
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agreements, Utah has a long history of recognizing oral agreements for both 
partnerships and limited liability companies. Ever since Utah codified the then-
common law with respect to general partnerships by its adoption of the Uniform 
Partnership Act (1917) in 1921,
26
 Utah has permitted oral partnership 
agreements.
27
 Utah’s recognition of oral partnership agreements was expanded to 
limited partnerships in 1990 with the adoption of the Utah Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act,
28
 which explicitly states that a partnership agreement may 
be “written or oral.”
29
 Utah then permitted oral operating agreements for LLCs
30
 
when it enacted its first LLC statute, the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, in 
1991.
31
 It was not until 2001 with the adoption of the Current Act
32
 that operating 
agreements were first required to be in writing.
33
 Given the broad acceptance of 
oral agreements as well as Utah’s present and historical recognition of such 
agreements, there is no legitimate reason for the now-disparate treatment with 
respect to Utah LLCs. 
The writing requirement disproportionately disadvantages unsophisticated 
individuals and persons who are not represented by legal counsel. A large 
percentage of LLCs (roughly estimated to be between 50–60%)
34
 are formed by 
nonlawyers, including accountants, filing services, and unsophisticated individuals. 
The LLCs these parties form are less likely to have a written operating agreement. 
Sophisticated or well-advised parties, on the other hand, are much more likely to 
have a written operating agreement. Accordingly, the class of persons who need 
the most protection will benefit most by permitting oral operating agreements. 
The Current Act replaces often integral and essential business terms that have 
not been memorialized in a written operating agreement with a one-size-fits-all 
statutory set of business terms. This replacement of informally agreed-to business 
terms with completely unrelated business terms runs the risk of distorting or even 
destroying the original intent of the parties. An example of such distortion or 
destruction is readily apparent in LLCs with no written operating agreement and 
so-called service members. Service members are persons who are granted equity in 
exchange for services to or for the benefit of the LLC. A popular method of 
                                                 
26
 Uniform Partnership Act, ch. 89, 1921 Utah Laws 253 (codified at UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 48-1-1 to -48). 
27
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-3, -4, -13 (silent—no written requirement). 
28
 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, ch. 233, 1990 Utah Laws 1126 (codified 
at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2a-101 to -1107). 
29
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2a-101(10). 
30
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126 (LexisNexis Supp. 2000) (repealed 2001) (silent—
no written requirement). 
31
 Utah Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 258, 1991 Utah Laws 991  
(repealed 2001). 
32
 Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 260, 2001 Utah Laws 1213 
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-101 to -1902). 
33
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-102(16). 
34
 Percentage range is based on NCCUSL’s anecdotal, nonscientific survey of filing 
officers in the various states that have enacted or are studying the RULLCA. 
20 UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW [NO. 1 
 
 
providing equity-based compensation to LLC service members, including 
founders, is the granting of a “profits interest.”
35
 However, a member who receives 
a profits interest in exchange for services to or for the benefit of the LLC does not 
receive credit to his capital account for the value of such services. Since the 







 and liquidating distributions
39
 are all based upon the members’ 
capital account balances, a service member under such default rules would have 
nothing—no right to current distributions, no voting percentage interest, no receipt 
of allocation of profits or losses, and no participation in a liquidating distribution. 
Therefore, if not memorialized in a written operating agreement, the default rules 
of the Current Act would override every business deal involving a service member 
receiving a profits interest, thereby distorting or destroying the original intent of 
the parties. 
Given the potential for extreme inequity resulting from the parties’ distorted 
or destroyed intent, it is likely that a court faced with such a dilemma would use its 
equitable powers based on either a theory of unjust enrichment or detrimental 
reliance to try to achieve some sort of equitable solution. The court’s exercise of its 
equitable powers may result in an outcome still different from the original intent of 
the parties and could therefore lead to even greater uncertainty for the parties 
involved. 
Permitting oral agreements will result in greater certainty. Businesses want 
certainty that the business deal to which the parties have agreed will be followed—
whether that deal is oral, written, or otherwise. Certainty as to a particular 
outcome, while important, is not as important as certainty that the right or correct 
outcome will occur (i.e., the terms accurately reflect the parties’ intentions). In 
contrast, the writing requirement actually results in less certainty in that the 
intended business terms are irrelevant in the absence of a written agreement and, 
subject to the court’s equitable gerrymandering, are replaced with statutory default 
                                                 
35
 A profits interest is an equity-based form of compensation that allows a member to 
share in the future economic appreciation of the value of an LLC but does not provide the 
member with an interest in the current value of an LLC. If the profits interest is structured 
to meet certain Internal Revenue Service requirements, the granting of the profits interest 
will not be a taxable event. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
36
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1001 (“[C]urrent distributions shall be allocated among 
the members in proportion to the members’ capital account balance as of the beginning of 
the company’s current fiscal year.”). 
37
 Id. § 48-2c-704(10) (“[V]oting at a meeting [of the members] shall be determined 
by percentage interests in the profits of the company . . . .”). 
38
 Id. § 48-2c-906 (“[P]rofits and losses shall be allocated in proportion to the 
members’ capital account balances as of the beginning of the company’s current  
fiscal year.”). 
39
 Id. § 48-2c-1308(2) (“Company assets remaining . . . shall be allocated and 
distributed . . . in accordance with the members’ final capital account balances after 
allocation of all profits and losses including profits and losses accrued or incurred during 
winding up.”). 
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terms which may be completely different (for all parties) from the intended 
business deal. 
Also, permitting oral operating agreements is not likely to result in more 
litigation. Anecdotally, in the almost one hundred years that Utah has had a 
codified partnership statute that has permitted oral agreements, Utah’s courts have 
not been overwhelmed with oral partnership litigation matters. Therefore, why 
should permitting oral operating agreements result in significantly more litigation? 
The argument that litigation will increase is based solely on the assumption that the 
party alleging oral terms, when apprised of the statutory requirement that the 
operating agreement must be in writing, will pack up and go home or otherwise be 
dissuaded from bringing suit. This is not a reasonable assumption, especially, as 
noted above, if the party alleging oral terms can bring action under theories of 
unjust enrichment and detrimental reliance. 
Finally, from a public policy perspective, in a business-friendly state, the 
policy should be to defer to the business deal agreed upon by the parties, whether 
that agreement is in writing or not. A business-friendly state should fall back to 
default statutory terms only as a last resort when the parties have either not 
considered or not agreed upon a specific term. If a party can prove the existence of 
agreed-upon terms, the State should not interfere or interject statutory business 
terms wholly unrelated to a business deal. A policy of deferring to the actual 
business deal not only adds much needed certainty, but also does not 
disproportionately disadvantage unsophisticated or unrepresented parties who are 
more likely to have oral agreements. 
 
D.  The Current Act’s Outdated Application of Statutory Apparent Authority 
Unnecessarily Decreases Management Flexibility 
 
The Current Act unnecessarily restricts the often-touted advantage of LLCs 
having a potentially infinite variety of management structures to two statutorily 
predetermined structures (i.e., manager-managed or member-managed).
40
 
Furthermore, the Current Act statutorily confers actual and apparent authority to 




As stated above, one of the benefits of the LLC structure is its flexible 
management structure. An LLC’s management (i.e., those who have the authority 
to manage the affairs of the LLC and the legal power to bind the LLC) can be 
structured in any way the members choose. In contrast, the management structures 
of general partnerships, limited partnerships, and corporations are statutorily 
dictated and less flexible. For example, an LLC’s management structure can be 
made to resemble the management structure of other entities.
42
 An LLC’s 
                                                 
40
 Id. § 48-2c-403(1)(f)–(g). 
41
 Id. § 48-2c-802. 
42
 For LLCs with a general partnership-type management structure, all of the 
members have the right to participate in managing the LLC and are agents with the power 
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management structure is not, however, just limited to those resembling other 
entities’ management structures; it can be custom-tailored to meet the needs and 
desires of the LLC’s members. 
Notwithstanding this supposed flexibility, the Current Act requires that the 
LLC publicly select between two statutorily preordained structures (i.e., manager-
managed or member-managed)
43
 and then links statutory power to bind to the 
selected structures.
44
 This concept of statutory apparent authority by position (i.e., 
each member in a member-managed LLC, and each manager in a manager-
managed LLC has apparent authority to act on behalf of and bind the LLC in the 
ordinary course of business) dates back at least to the original 1914 Uniform 
Partnership Act.
45
 Since then, the concept of statutory apparent authority based on 
position has found its way into the various uniform partnership and limited liability 
company acts. 
The “position” concept of statutory apparent authority makes sense for both 
general and limited partnerships, but not for LLCs. Both types of partnerships have 
well-defined, well-known, predictable, and almost paradigmatic management 
structures. A third party dealing with either type of partnership can know by the 
formal name of the partnership and by the person’s status as general or limited 
partner whether the person has power to bind the partnership. The concept of 
statutory apparent authority does not, however, make sense with respect to LLCs 
because an LLC’s name gives no indication as to its management structure and, 
more importantly, because an LLC may use an almost infinite variety of 
management structures. 
Statutory apparent authority causes problems when the members of an LLC 
do not extend actual authority to every manager in a manager-managed LLC or 
every member in a member-managed LLC. For example, the members may want a 
corporate, board-style management structure where the board of managers is 
intended to operate as a group, and no single manager acting alone has actual 
authority to act on behalf of the LLC. In such instances, the Current Act frustrates 
the intended management structure by providing that each manager has statutory 
apparent authority to act on behalf of and bind the LLC in the ordinary course of 
the LLC’s business. Even if an LLC has a written operating agreement that 
provides for a board-style management structure, a manager may, without actual 
authority, bind the LLC in the ordinary course of business if a third party does not 
know or does not otherwise have actual or constructive notice that the manager 
lacks authority.
46
 Under the Current Act, limitations on a manager’s or member’s 
                                                                                                                            
to bind the LLC. Alternatively, for LLCs with a limited partnership-type management 
structures, fewer than all of the members participate in managing the LLC and are agents 
with the power to bind the LLC. Finally, for LLCs with a corporation-type management 
structure, a board and officers manage the LLC, with no board member acting alone having 
the power to bind the LLC. 
43
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-403(1)(f)–(g). 
44
 Id. § 48-2c-802. 
45
 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9 (amended 1997). 
46
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-802. 
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statutory apparent authority must be set forth in an LLC’s articles of 
organization.
47




 and the 
Revised Prototype Act
50
 each depart from the statutory apparent authority model 
found under the legacy LLC statutes, including the Current Act. 
The Delaware LLC Act provides in part: “Unless otherwise provided in [an 
operating] agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the 
[LLC].”
51
 As such, the Delaware LLC Act does not vest statutory apparent 
authority in a person or persons based on the type of management structure 
adopted by the LLC (i.e., member-managed or manager-managed); instead, it puts 
all third parties on notice that no member or manager has statutory apparent 
authority to bind the LLC. One commentator summarized the practical application 
of this section with the following anecdote: “[W]hen the man says, ‘I can do 
anything unless my wife says I may not,’ I question anyone’s ability to rely upon 
him without her there to confirm he may act.”
52
 Just as a third-party would check 
with the man’s wife in the anecdote, so must third parties look to a Delaware 
LLC’s operating agreement to determine whether a person purporting to have 
authority has authority to engage in the particular act. 
RULLCA section 301(a) expressly provides that members have no statutory 
apparent authority.
53
 Furthermore, by its silence (i.e., no specific statutory 
authority granted), managers of a manager-managed LLC also do not have 
statutory apparent authority. The Revised Prototype Act goes even further and 
provides that no person shall have the power to bind the LLC except to the extent 
that such person is authorized in the LLC operating agreement, by the members in 
a duly filed statement of authority, or as provided by law.
54
 The following 
introductory comment to the Revised Prototype Act describes the ABA’s reason 
for the elimination of the manager-managed and member-managed dichotomy and 
statutory actual and apparent authority: 
 
The [Revised Prototype] Act changes significantly the original Prototype 
Act in that it eliminates the member-managed and manager-managed 
bifurcation of management structures and the statutorily conferred actual 
and apparent authority of members and managers in those paradigms. 
Instead, the [Revised Prototype] Act provides that a person’s actual or 
apparent authority to bind the limited liability company will be 




 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005). 
49
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a) (2006). 
50
 REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301 (2011). 
51
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402. 
52
 Thomas E. Rutledge & Steven G. Frost, RULLCA Section 301—The Fortunate 
Consequences (and Continuing Questions) of Distinguishing Apparent Agency and 
Decisional Authority, 64 BUS. LAW. 37, 46 n.48 (2008) (citation omitted). 
53
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a) (“A member is not an agent of [an 
LLC] solely by reason of being a member.”). 
54
 REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301. 
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determined with reference to the limited liability company agreement, 
decisions of the members in accordance with the limited liability 
company agreement or the default rules of the [Revised Prototype] Act, a 
statement of authority, or law other than the [Revised Prototype] Act 
such as the common law of agency. This approach allows drafters to 
provide for managers, officers, boards of directors, and other forms of 
governance that were difficult if not impossible to accomplish under the 




LLC acts that do not base statutory apparent authority on position do not 
impose a significantly greater burden on third parties—contracting or otherwise—
doing business with LLCs (e.g., banks and title insurance companies) to make sure 
that the person with whom they are dealing has authority. Under the Current Act, 
third parties without knowledge to the contrary are entitled to rely on a Utah LLC’s 
filings with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code (i.e., articles of 
organization and annual report) for purposes of determining authority. While 
checking applicable filings has the benefits of speed and simplicity, it also runs the 
risk of inaccuracy. In the absence of statutory apparent authority, however, the due 
diligence of a third party doing business with an LLC is not substantially different 
from what third parties must do when conducting business with a corporation (i.e., 
review charter documents and obtain secretary and incumbency certificates). In 
addition, some state LLC acts that do not have statutory apparent authority provide 
for the filing of statements of authority as a means of providing evidence of 
authority of a position, office, or person to enter into transactions.
56
 Such 
statements of authority serve as notice of who does or does not have authority to 
act for and bind the LLC. In addition, such statements of authority provide the 
same benefits of speed and simplicity found under the Current Act. Therefore, 
because the necessary due diligence performed in the absence of statutory apparent 
authority is substantially the same as what is already performed for corporations, 
and since filed statements of authority provide evidence of actual authority, LLC 
acts without statutory apparent authority do not impose a significantly greater 
burden on third parties. 
The increasingly outdated concept of statutory apparent authority by position 
in LLCs decreases management flexibility and is therefore less business-friendly. 
The elimination of statutory apparent authority will provide greater management 
flexibility, and therefore a more pro-business statute, by permitting LLCs to 
(i) adopt an almost infinite variety of management structures (as opposed to the 
two statutorily predetermined structures set forth in the Current Act), and 
(ii) determine which persons, positions, or offices have actual authority to bind the 
                                                 
55
 Revised Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act Editorial Bd., supra note 4, at 119–20. 
56
 E.g., D.C. CODE § 29-803.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-
172(d) (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-302 (Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 489.302(3) (West Supp. 2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1542 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-127 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-302 (2011). 
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LLC without authority being statutorily endowed. Furthermore, this greater 
flexibility is achieved without imposing a significantly greater burden on third 
parties doing business with the LLC. 
 
E.  Members Have Limited Asset Protection Because  
Foreclosures on LLC Interests Are Permitted 
 
Unlike many LLC statutes that limit a creditor’s right against a debtor-
member’s LLC interest to a charging order, the Current Act permits foreclosure 
thereby depriving members of Utah LLCs of a potentially valuable asset protection 
tool.
57
 Furthermore, the Current Act requires, as a condition precedent to ordering 
foreclosure, that a creditor make a showing that distributions under the charging 
order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable time, thus inadequately 
balancing the rights of both creditors and debtors. 
An important aspect of the law of unincorporated business organizations (i.e., 
partnerships and LLCs) is the “pick your partner” principle. Most, if not all, LLC 
statutes provide that, subject to certain limited exceptions, a transferee of an LLC 
interest is not automatically admitted as a member of the LLC. LLC statutes often 
require express consent of the existing members for admission of a new member. 
An extension of the “pick your partner” principle is the use of charging 
orders, in lieu of foreclosure and liquidation, as a creditor remedy to satisfy a 
member’s personal debts. Charging orders operate much like garnishments and 
require an LLC to pay to a debtor-member’s creditor amounts that otherwise would 
be distributed to the debtor-member until the debt is satisfied or otherwise 
discharged. A charging order constitutes a lien on a debtor-member’s LLC interest. 
Once the liability has been satisfied, either with distributions from the LLC or 
otherwise, the charging order terminates, and the rights to receive distributions 
with respect to the LLC interest are fully restored to the debtor-member. 
Importantly, a creditor with a charging order does not become a member of the 
LLC and, accordingly, has no voting or management rights in the LLC. 
Many LLC acts limit a creditor’s right against a debtor-member’s LLC 
interest to a charging order.
58
 Such states are viewed as friendly toward LLC 
                                                 
57
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b) (West Supp. 2012). 
58
 In several states a charging order is the exclusive remedy by which a member’s 
judgment creditor may satisfy a judgment out of the member’s LLC interest. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 10A-5-6.05 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.380 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 29-655 (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 608.433 (West Supp. 2012) (excluding single-member LLCs); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-
504 (Supp. 2012) (except as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a written 
operating agreement); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,113 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, 
§ 1573; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4507 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 322B.32 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-703 (West 1999); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 86-401 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-45 (West 2004); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2034 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-504 (2007); 
26 UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW [NO. 1 
 
 
members because they preclude a creditor from foreclosing on a debtor-member’s 
LLC interest. For example, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act provides, 
“The entry of a charging order is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment 
creditor of a member or of a member’s assignee may satisfy a judgment out of the 
judgment debtor’s limited liability company interest.”
59
 Some states, in addition to 
providing that a charging order is the exclusive remedy, expressly preclude 
foreclosure.
60
 Nevada, for example, states that: 
 
[A charging order is] the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor 
of a member or an assignee of a member may satisfy a judgment out of 
the member’s interest of the judgment debtor, whether the limited-
liability company has one member or more than one member. No other 
remedy, including, without limitation, foreclosure on the member’s 
interest or a court order for directions, accounts and inquiries that the 
debtor or member might have made, is available to the judgment creditor 
attempting to satisfy the judgment out of the judgment debtor’s interest 





In contrast, the Current Act takes a “liquidation approach” pursuant to which 
a creditor can foreclose on the debtor-member’s LLC interest and receive 
permanent economic rights in the LLC interest, including rights to distributions 
from the LLC after the member’s debt has been satisfied.
62
 Under the Current Act, 
a court may order foreclosure of an interest in a Utah LLC subject to a charging 
order at any time.
63
 Unlike certain other states that expressly permit foreclosure on 
a debtor-member’s interest, the Current Act does not require a showing by the 
creditor that the distributions under the charging order will fail to pay the judgment 
debt within a reasonable time before ordering foreclosure.
64
 While the most pro-
                                                                                                                            
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-509 (Supp. 2011); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.112 
(West Supp. 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-503. 
59
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-703(d). 
60
 The following states expressly preclude foreclosure: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. 
§ 10.50.380(c); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-504(b) (except as otherwise provided in 
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 31, § 1573(7); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4507(5)–(6); Nevada, NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.401(2)(a); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-45; Oklahoma, 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2034; South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-504(e); 
Texas, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.112(c); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1041.1(E) (2011); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-503(g). 
61
 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-401(2)(a) (emphasis added). Almost identical language 
is found in the Wyoming LLC Act. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-503(g). 
62




 The following jurisdictions permit foreclosure only after a showing that the 
distributions under a charging order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable 
time: District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 29-805.03(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Florida, 
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business approach would be to expressly prohibit foreclosure altogether, permitted 
foreclosure—only upon a showing that distributions will not pay the judgment debt 
within a reasonable time—at least requires the court to balance the rights of the 
member and the creditor and is more pro-business than permitted foreclosure at 
any time without any such showing. 
The liquidation approach set forth in the Current Act (i.e., permitting 
foreclosure without any showing) not only deprives members of Utah LLCs of a 
potentially valuable asset protection tool, but, without such a showing requirement, 
it also lacks a condition precedent that is intended to balance the rights of both 
creditors and debtors. Accordingly, legal practitioners and entrepreneurs often cite 





F.  Default Economic Rules Conflict with Federal Tax Law  
and Do Not Account for “Profits Interest” 
 
The Current Act’s default rules for profit and loss allocations and distributions 
may result in profit and loss allocations that do not comply with applicable federal 
tax rules. In addition, these same default rules when combined with the default rule 
for voting do not allow for profits-interest members. 









 are each based upon the 
members’ capital account balances. However, a member’s capital account is 
defined in the Current Act as follows: 
 
“Capital account,” unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, 
means the account, as adjusted from time to time, maintained by the 
company for each member to reflect: 
                                                                                                                            
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.433(6) (West Supp. 2012) (with respect to single-member LLCs); 
Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-503(3) (Supp. 2012); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 489.503(3) (West 2009); and Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2654(4) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2011). 
65
 For example, sophisticated estate planning and asset protection attorneys will often 
elect to form LLCs for their Utah clients in neighboring Nevada or Wyoming. 
66
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1001 (“[C]urrent distributions shall be allocated among 
the members in proportion to the members’ capital account balance as of the beginning of 
the company’s current fiscal year.”). 
67
 Id. § 48-2c-906 (“[P]rofits and losses shall be allocated in proportion to the 
members’ capital account balances as of the beginning of the company’s current  
fiscal year.”). 
68
 Id. § 48-2c-1308(2) (“Company assets remaining after [dissolution and winding up] 
. . . shall be allocated and distributed . . . in accordance with the members’ final capital 
account balances after allocation of all profits and losses including profits and losses 
accrued or incurred during winding up.”). 
69
 Id. § 48-2c-704(10) (“[V]oting at a meeting [of the members] shall be determined 
by percentage interest in the profits of the company . . . .”). 
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(a) the value of all contributions by that member; 
(b) the amount of all distributions to that member or the  
member’s assignee; 
(c) the member’s share of profits, gains, and losses of the  
company; and 
(d) the member’s share of the net assets of the company upon 





In addition, the Current Act provides that, except as otherwise provided in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement, the capital accounts of the 
members shall be adjusted to reflect the revaluation of the company assets upon 
the occurrence of certain events (i.e., greater than de minimis capital contribution 
or distribution, dissolution and winding up of the company, a merger of the 
company, or the grant of a greater than de minimis profits interest).
71
 
It seems clear from the language of sections 48-2c-102(3) and 48-2c-903 that 
the authors of the Current Act were trying to incorporate the federal income tax 
concept of a capital account. The Treasury regulations, however, take several 
pages to define a capital account and describe its maintenance while the Current 
Act takes fewer than 350 words. Accordingly, there are scenarios where a capital 
account for federal income tax purposes will be different than a capital account 
determined under the default rules of the Current Act. 
When such differences do occur, what allocation rules (i.e., federal tax or 
Current Act) should LLCs follow? To try and resolve this question, it is important 
to remember that the Internal Revenue Service may alter the members’ allocations 
if such allocations do not have substantial economic effect and if the term “capital 
account” (as defined in the Treasury regulations) is used to make that 
determination. 
Since federal law (i.e., the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury 
regulations) will ultimately determine a member’s share of profits and losses for 
tax purposes, why then is it necessary to have a default rule in the Current Act for 
allocating profits and losses? The ULLCA, the ULPA (2001), the RULLCA, and 
the Revised Prototype Act omit any default rule for allocation of profits and losses. 
The Comment to section 503 of the ULPA (2001) explains the rationale for the 
omission as follows: 
 
This Act has no provision allocating profits and losses among the 
partners. Instead, the Act directly apportions the right to receive 
distributions. Nearly all limited partnerships will choose to allocate 
profits and losses in order to comply with applicable tax, accounting and 
                                                 
70
 Id. § 48-2c-102(3). 
71
 Id. § 48-2c-903(1)(c). 
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other regulatory requirements. Those requirements, rather than the Act, 




Furthermore, basing default rules for profit and loss allocations, distributions, 
and voting percentage interests on capital account balances does not provide 
allowance for profits-interest members. As noted above, a member who receives a 
profits interest in exchange for services to or for the benefit of the LLC does not 
receive credit to his capital account for the value of such services. Accordingly, 
under the black-letter law reading of the default rules in the Current Act, a profits-
interest member would have no capital account, no right to current distributions, no 
voting percentage interest, would receive no allocation of profits or losses, and 
would not participate in a liquidating distribution. To allow for the recognition of 
profits-interest members, the default rules should be based on something other than 
the members’ capital accounts (regardless of whether defined as set forth in the 
Treasury regulations or in the Current Act) or the members’ capital contributions.
73
 
Therefore, the application of the Current Act’s default rules for profit and loss 
allocations, distributions, and voting percentage interests (a) do not provide 
allowance for profits-interest members and (b) may result in profit and loss 
allocations that do not comply with applicable federal tax rules. 
 
G.  The Current Act Fails to Set a Default Rule for  
How a Vote of the Managers Decides Matters 
 
The Current Act fails to have a default rule for how a vote of managers 
decides matters in a multi-manager, manager-managed LLC. Having to apply a 
unanimous voting standard in the absence of a contrary standard is antibusiness 
because inherent in such standard is the potential for deadlock and abuse. 
The Current Act only contains a default rule for deciding matters without a 
meeting, without prior notice, and without a vote.
74
 Absent from the Current Act is 
how a vote of the managers is to decide matters. Because there is no default rule 
for deciding matters by a vote, to be safe, unless a written operating agreement or 
articles of organization provide for an alternative voting standard, any matter to be 
decided by a vote of the managers should be decided by a unanimous vote. Failure 
                                                 
72
 UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 503 cmt. (2001); see also REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 404 cmt. (2006). 
73
 The default rules of RULLCA provide that (a) with respect to nonliquidating 
distributions, such distributions are to be made in equal shares, see REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CORP. ACT § 404(a); (b) with respect to liquidating distributions, such distributions are to 
be made first to return capital and then in equal shares, see id. § 708(b); and (c) with 
respect to management, decisions are either made unanimously or by a majority (in 
number) of the members, see id. § 407(b)(3)–(5), (c)(4)–(5). 
74
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-808 provides that “on any matter that is to be voted on 
by the managers . . . [they] may take action without a meeting, without prior notice, and 
without a vote, if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, is signed by all of 
the managers . . . .” 
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to obtain the unanimous vote of the managers as to a particular matter—when the 
LLC’s articles of organization or operating agreement provide no alternative 
voting standard—would leave the particular matter subject to a potential challenge 
for not having been properly or duly authorized. 
Once again Utah is in the minority; a large majority of states provide 
complete default rules for how managers decide matters, whether by vote or 
consent.
75
 For example, the California LLC Act provides, “Except as otherwise 
provided in the articles of organization or the operating agreement, . . . decisions of 




Furthermore, a unanimous vote standard, which as noted above should be 
used in the absence of a default rule, is an antagonistic business standard. 
Unanimity inherently has the potential for deadlock, wherein the managers cannot 
all agree and thus the LLC’s business is prevented from moving forward without 
judicial or third-party intervention. Unanimity also provides fertile ground for 
more nefarious conduct. For example, one or more managers could hold an LLC, 
the other managers, and even the members hostage to extort some unmerited 
                                                 
75
 The following states have a manager voting default rule: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. 
§ 10.50.150(b) (2010); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(B), (D), (E) (Supp. 
2012); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403(a) (2001); California, CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 17156 (West 2006); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401(1) (2012); Connecticut, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-142(a) (West 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4231(6) 
(West 2007); Georgia, GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-11-308(a)(2) (2003); Hawaii, HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 428-404(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2008); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-
407(3)(c) (Supp. 2012); Illinois, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1(b)(2) (West 2010); 
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-3(b) (West 2010); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 489.407.3(c) (West Supp. 2012); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.175(1) (West 
2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1316 (2010); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 156C, § 26(d) (LexisNexis 2012); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. 
§ 450.4405(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.653 (West 
2004); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-401(7) (2011); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 347.079(4) (West 2012); Montana, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 35-8-307(2)(b) (2011); New 
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:33(V) (2005); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53-19-17(B)(3) (2012); New York, N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 408(b) (McKinney Supp. 
2012); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20(b) (2011); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 10-32-83 (2012); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. 18 § 2018 (West 2012); Oregon, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 63.130(2)(b) (2011); Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8942(a) 
(West Supp. 2012); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-19 (Supp. 2011); South Carolina, 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-404(b)(2) (2006); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-
404.1(b)(2) (2007)); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-239-112(c) (West 2010); Texas, 
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.355 (West Supp. 2012); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11 § 3054(b)(2) (West 2010); Virginia, VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-1024(G) (2011); 
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.165(1) (West Supp. 2011); West Virginia, 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-4-404(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT.  
ANN. § 183.0404(1)(b) (West 2002); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29- 
407(c)(iii) (2011). 
76
 CAL. CORP. CODE § 17156. 
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benefit. Accordingly, the application of the unanimous vote standard as a default 
rule is decidedly antibusiness. In contrast, recognizing the potential for deadlock 
and abuse as well as the resulting negative effects on business, all of the  






The failure of the Current Act to include a default rule for how matters are 
decided by the vote of managers results in the application of the antagonistic 
business standard of a unanimous vote of the managers. Such a standard is higher 
than the standard all states that have a manager voting default rule apply and 
exposes LLCs to potential manager deadlock and abuse. 
 
IV.  UTAH’S REVISED UNIFORM LLC ACT 
 
Since NCCUSL adopted the ULLCA in 1994, there have been significant 
developments related to LLCs, which were noted in the introduction. The 
RULLCA was drafted with these developments in mind. The members of the 
drafting committees of the RULLCA included practicing lawyers, judges, 
legislators, and law professors who are some of the nation’s most knowledgeable 
and well-versed experts in LLC issues and drafting legislation. In addition to the 
members of NCCUSL’s drafting committee, ABA members nationally recognized 
as experts with respect to LLCs and representing several different ABA sections
79
 
served as advisors to the RULLCA drafting committee. The RULLCA was drafted 
in terms that are consistent with other commercial law statutes, such as RUPA and 
ULPA (2001). In fact, the harmonized versions of these acts have a similar look 




















 and New Jersey
89
 have introduced legislation to adopt the RULLCA. 
                                                 
77
 The “majority vote” standard is the vote of a majority of the managers on a per 
capita basis. 
78
 See statutes cited supra note 75. 
79
 The ABA sections represented included (i) ABA Business Law Section, (ii) ABA 
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, and (iii) ABA Tax Section. 
80
 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 489.101–.1304. 
81
 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-101 to -197 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
82
 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105 (Supp. 2012). 
83
 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-101 to -1104 (Supp. 2012). 
84
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-3-101 to -1405 (West Supp. 2012) (effective July 1, 2013). 
85
 D.C. CODE §§ 29-801.01 to -810.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
86
 Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch.  
419, at 3967–4055 (West). 
87
 H.B. 2261, 2011 Sess. (Kan. 2011) (sponsored by Lance Kinzer). H.B. 2261 died in 
the Committee on Judiciary on June 1, 2012. 
88
 H.B. 1274, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011) (sponsored by Doug Wardlow). 
89
 S.B. 742, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (sponsored by Paul A. Sarlo). 





 while based on the HRULLCA, incorporates certain 
Utah-specific provisions: (a) the existing election to purchase in lieu of dissolution 
provision in the Current Act
91
 that permits an LLC or its members to purchase the 
interest of the member who has sought judicial dissolution of the LLC for 
oppressive, harmful, illegal, or fraudulent conduct by the managers or control 
members;
92
 (b) an updated version of the existing professional LLC provisions of 
the Current Act;
93
 (c) an updated version of the Current Act’s series LLC 
provisions;
94
 (d) the existing low-profit limited liability company provisions;
95
 and 
(e) a change to the standard courts apply when considering whether to invalidate 
operating agreement provisions that address fiduciary duty and other sensitive 
matters from “manifestly unreasonable”
96
 to a more predictable and business-
friendly “unconscionable or against public policy” standard.
97
 
In very general terms, the Proposed Act is more detailed, more up-to-date, and 
more business friendly than the Current Act. The following sections will note 
significant provisions of the Proposed Act, paying particular attention to how the 
Proposed Act addresses the previously identified problems in the Current Act. 
 
A.  The Proposed Act’s Structure Has the Same Look and Feel  
as Other Uniform Statutes 
 
The structure of the Proposed Act closely resembles that of the RUPA, the 
ULLCA, and the ULPA (2001).
98
 Using a common and familiar structure has 
many advantages over Utah’s existing one-of-a-kind LLC Act. These advantages 
include (a) consistency and uniformity with Utah’s and other states’ uniform 
business statutes, (b) similar terminology and concepts that appear in other modern 
business and commercial statutes, (c) ease in finding and locating provisions, and 
(d) ease in identifying differences between similar statutes. 
With the adoption of the Proposed Act as well as the Utah-specific versions of 
the HRUPA and HULPA, each of Utah’s unincorporated business statutes will 
have uniform provisions with a similar look and feel. For example, formation, 
charging order, derivative proceedings, foreign admission, and organic change 
provisions (e.g., mergers) in the Proposed Act mirror similar provisions in the Utah 
versions of the HRUPA and HULPA. This uniformity will result in greater 
                                                 
90
 S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012). 
91
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1214 (West Supp. 2012). 
92
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-702. 
93
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-1501 to -1513; S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1101 to -1112. 
94
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-606 to -616; S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1201 to -1209. 
95
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412; S.B. 21 §§ 48-3a-1301 to -1304. 
96
 HARMONIZED REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 105(c)(6), (d)(3), (e) (2011). 
97
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112(3)(f), (4)(c), (5). 
98
 Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 519 (2007) (discussing 
RULLCA upon which the structure of the HRULLCA and the Proposed Act are based). 
2013] UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF RULLCA 33 
 
 
predictability as to what these statutes say and as to how Utah’s courts will 
interpret them. 
 
B.  The Proposed Act Permits Perpetual Life LLCs 
 
The Proposed Act removes the long-outdated provision of the Current Act 
that explicitly limits the duration of LLCs.
99
 Instead, the Proposed Act specifically 
provides that an LLC has perpetual life
100





C.  Operating Agreements Become the Foundational Document and May Be Oral 
 
The Proposed Act defines “operating agreement” very broadly: “[An] 
agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, 
implied, in a record, or in any combination thereof, of all the members of a limited 
liability company, including a sole member, concerning the matters described in 
Subsection 48-3a-112(1).”
102
 The operating agreement may consist of a number of 
separate documents (or records), however denominated, unless the operating 
agreement itself provides otherwise.
103
 Under the Proposed Act, the operating 
agreement is the LLC’s foundational document
104
 even though formation of a Utah 
LLC pursuant to this statute will require the filing of a certificate of organization 
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
105
 As such, a conflict 
between an LLC’s operating agreement and its certificate of organization is 
generally resolved in favor of the LLC’s operating agreement.
106
 This is a shift 
toward those states, including Delaware, which have certificates of organization or 
formation that only evidence the formation or existence of the LLC and contain 
only minimal information.
107
 For example, the Proposed Act requires that only the 
name of the LLC, address of the principal office of the LLC, and registered agent 
information be set forth in the certificate of organization.
108
 The Proposed Act 
requires neither a statement as to how the LLC is managed nor the names and 
addresses of the members or managers. Therefore, instead of spreading 
management and other business provisions among an LLC’s articles of 
organization and operating agreement as required by the Current Act, under the 
Proposed Act, all such provisions will be located in the operating agreement. 
                                                 
99
 See supra Part III.A. 
100
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-104(3). 
101
 Id. § 48-3a-112(1). 
102
 Id. § 48-3a-102(16) (emphasis added). 
103
 Id. § 48-3a-112(1)(d). 
104
 Id. § 48-3a-112(1). 
105
 Id. § 48-3a-201. 
106
 Id. § 48-3a-114(4). 
107
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201 (2005 & Supp. 2010). 
108
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-201(2). 
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Having all of the business terms in one document will lead to greater consistency 
and efficiencies. 
As noted above, the Proposed Act’s definition of an operating agreement 
specifically permits oral agreements, thus avoiding the problems inherent in the 
Current Act’s writing requirement.
109
 This does not mean written agreements are 
not advisable. It merely recognizes the reality of informal business relationships 
and does not impose a statutory formality, where the failure to comply may result 
in a statutorily imposed business deal entirely unrelated to the actual business deal 
the members agreed upon. 
While the Proposed Act would permit the contents of an operating agreement 
to be established by written or spoken words, conduct, or some combination 
thereof, written operating agreements with integrated contract and written 
amendment provisions would minimize the potential that prior oral agreements or 
conduct and oral amendments to written operating agreements would be upheld.
110
 
The purpose of an integrated contract provision is to prevent the parties to a written 
agreement from later claiming that they had an agreement that was different from 
their written agreement, that the written agreement does not reflect their entire 
understanding, or that the written agreement is not consistent with prior 
agreements or conduct of the parties. With respect to an operating agreement with 
an integrated contract provision, any previous negotiations or agreements in which 
the members had considered different terms will be deemed superseded by the 
final written operating agreement. Such integration provisions are enforceable 
under Utah contract law.
111
 A written amendment provision is language included in 
a contract that provides that amendments to the contract must be in writing.
112
 
                                                 
109
 See supra Part III.C. 
110
 An integrated contract provision is language included in a contract that declares 
the contract to be the complete and final agreement between the parties. The following is 
an example of an integrated contract provision: “This Agreement, along with any exhibits, 
appendices, addendums, schedules, and amendments hereto, encompasses the entire 
agreement of the parties, and supersedes all previous understandings and agreements 
between the parties, whether oral or written. The parties hereby acknowledge and represent 
that said parties have not relied on any representation, assertion, guarantee, warranty, 
collateral contract, or other assurance, except those set out in this Agreement, made by or 
on behalf of any other party or any other person or entity whatsoever, prior to the execution 
of this Agreement. The parties hereby waive all rights and remedies, at law or in equity, 
arising or which may arise as the result of a party’s reliance on such representation, 
assertion, guarantee, warranty, collateral contract, or other assurance, provided that nothing 
herein contained shall be construed as a restriction or limitation of said party’s right to 
remedies associated with the gross negligence, willful misconduct, or fraud of any person 
or party taking place prior to, or contemporaneously with, the execution of this 
Agreement.” 
111
 See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 182 P.3d 326, 332 (Utah 2008) (“[I]n the 
face of a clear integration clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not 
admissible on the question of integration.”) 
112
 The following is an example of a written amendment provision: “This Agreement 
may only be amended by a written document duly executed by all parties.” 
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While the Proposed Act does not specifically authorize an operating agreement to 
limit the means by which it may be amended (e.g., modifications must be in a 
signed writing), section 48-3a-112(1)(d) does provide that the operating agreement 
governs “the means and conditions for amending the operating agreement.”
113
 
Furthermore, the comments to the RULLCA with respect to this section 
specifically state that this section “could be read to encompass such 
authorization.”
114
 Therefore, oral agreements are permitted, thereby avoiding the 
problems inherent in the Current Act’s writing requirements. But given the broad 
number of potential sources from which the contents of an operating agreement 
can be established, written operating agreements with both an integrated contract 
provision and a written amendment provision should be used to maximize 
certainty. 
 
D.  Members Are Permitted Greater Latitude in Defining, Altering,  
and Eliminating Fiduciary Duties—Increased Freedom of Contract 
 
As compared to the Current Act, the Proposed Act provides greater latitude to 
owners in structuring their business deals (i.e., freedom of contract) and is 
therefore more business friendly. In doing so, the Proposed Act fairly balances 
public policy concerns regarding the contractual obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing with the extent to which owners may alter and eliminate fiduciary duties. 
Historically, the law of “fiduciary duty in unincorporated business 
organizations was mostly a matter of case law.”
115
 As stated in the comments to the 
RULLCA, “Until the promulgation of RUPA, it was almost axiomatic that: 
(i) fiduciary duties reflect judge-made law; and (ii) statutory formulations can 
express some of that law but do not exhaustively codify it.”
116
 While the original 
UPA followed this approach, RUPA took a radically different approach and sought 
to exhaustively codify all fiduciary duties relevant to a RUPA partnership and its 
partners.
117
 The principal reason for this new approach was to “‘cabin in’ fiduciary 
duties so as to protect partnership agreements from judicial second guessing.”
118
 
This cabin-in approach was followed by both the ULLCA and the ULPA (2001).
119
 
The RULLCA and the Proposed Act take a different approach. The RULLCA 
drafting committee determined, after careful consideration, that “the ‘cabin in’ 
                                                 
113
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112(1)(d). 
114
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(a)(4) cmt (2006). 
115
 Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 98, at 522. 
116
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt. 
117
 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 1 (1997) (“Section 404 is both 
comprehensive and exhaustive.”). Section 404(a) provides, “The only fiduciary duties a 
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).” Id. § 404(a). 
118
 Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 98, at 522 . 
119
 UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408 (2001); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a) (1996). 
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approach creates more problems than it solves.”
120
 The cabin-in approach ignores 
the implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties such as the duty of controlling 
members to not oppress fellow members, and puts an inordinate amount of 
pressure on the concept of “good faith and fair dealing.”
121
 The RULLCA drafting 
committee also determined a better way to protect the operating agreement from 
judicial second-guessing: (i) “[I]ncrease and clarify the power of the operating 
agreement to define and re-shape fiduciary duties (including the power to eliminate 
aspects of fiduciary duties),”
122
 and (ii) “provide some guidance to the courts when 
a person seeks to” invalidate a provision of an operating agreement on the grounds 
that the provision is, under the RULLCA, “manifestly unreasonable.”
123
 




The Proposed Act continues the Current Act’s “uncabined” approach, but 
with some improvements. The Current Act codifies both the duty of care
125
 and the 
duty of loyalty,
126
 but it does not contain language limiting or cabining the 
fiduciary duties to just these codified duties. The Proposed Act improves upon the 
Current Act’s approach by (a) providing in detail the extent to which the operating 
agreement can define, alter, or eliminate aspects of fiduciary duty;
127
 (b) expressly 
limiting the ability to “relieve or exonerate a person from liability for conduct 
involving bad faith, willful misconduct, or recklessness;”
128
 and (c) providing 
                                                 
120
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT , prefatory note; see also David Walker, Chair 
of Drafting Comm., Remarks at the Third Session of Proceedings in the Committee of the 
Whole Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 8, 2006) (transcript available at National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (“We have, we say, ‘uncabined’ 
fiduciary duties.”). 
121
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT prefatory note; see also Daniel Kleinberger, 
Co-Reporter of Drafting Comm. Remarks at the Fourth Session of Proceedings in the 
Committee of the Whole Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 8, 2006) (transcript available 
at National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (“[W]e are already 
seeing pressure in the courts on the duty of good faith and fair dealing. When you say there 
are no other fiduciary duties and courts for hundreds of years have looked to fiduciary 
duties as a policing mechanism that they can develop, if you say you can’t have fiduciary 
duties, they will go to good faith. And, in fact, I had a conversation with [a] judge in . . . 
North Carolina . . . . The judge of North Carolina’s business courts said, if you stop us on 
fiduciary duty, we will just go to good faith.”). 
122
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT prefatory note. 
123
 Id. However, in lieu of the “manifestly unreasonable” standard used in the 
RULLCA, the Proposed Act has the more judicially predictable “unconscionable or against 
public policy” standard. S.B. 21, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 48-3a-112(3)(f) (Utah 2012). 
124
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110; S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112. 
125
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-807(1) (West Supp. 2012). 
126
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-807(2). 
127
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-112(4)(c)(i). 
128
 Id. § 48-3a-112(3)(g). 
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specific guidance to courts asked to invalidate an operating agreement provision on 
the grounds that the provision is “unconscionable or against public policy.”
129
 
These provisions are more business-friendly than the Current Act, in that it grants 
greater latitude to owners in structuring their business deals while balancing public 
policy concerns regarding the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing 
and the alteration or elimination of fiduciary duties. 
 
E.  Members Have Greater Flexibility in Determining an LLC’s Management 
Structure with the Elimination of Statutory Apparent Authority 
 
The Proposed Act recognizes that “statutory apparent authority” is an attribute 
of partnership formality that does not belong in an LLC statute.
130
 Accordingly, the 
Proposed Act has eliminated the statutory link between the management structure 
and apparent authority. Thus, whether a member, manager, or some other person 
has power to bind an LLC becomes a matter of agency law. 
The Proposed Act expressly provides that members have no statutory 
apparent authority.
131
 Furthermore, by its silence (i.e., no specific statutory 
authority granted), managers of a manager-managed LLC also do not have 
statutory apparent authority. The following commentary, under the RULLCA, will 
apply to the Proposed Act: 
 
The actual authority of an LLC’s manager or managers is a question of 
agency law and depends on the contents of the operating agreement and 
any separate management contract between the LLC and its manager or 
managers. These agreements are the primary source of the manifestations 
of the LLC (as principal) from which a manager (as agent) will form the 





The comments to sections 301 and 407 of the RULLCA provide additional 




Eliminating statutory apparent authority also eliminates the need to have an 
LLC publicly indicate in its certificate of organization the LLC’s management 
                                                 
129
 Id. § 48-3a-112(5). 
130
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT prefatory note (2006); see supra Part III.D. 
131
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-301(1) (“A member is not an agent of [an LLC] solely by reason 
of being a member.”). 
132
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(c) cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 3.01 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 15, 26 (1958). 
133
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 301 cmt., 407 cmt. (analyzing in detail how 
agency law will function in the absence of statutory apparent authority, including, in the 
context of a multimember, member-managed, or multimanager, manager-managed LLC 
with an operating agreement that is silent as to how management responsibility is to be 
allocated between or among them). 
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structure. However, an LLC might want to make, or a third-party may require, as a 
condition to the business relationship or transaction, that the LLC make a public 
filing of its management structure. The Proposed Act addresses this issue by 
providing for the filing of statements of authority.
134
 Section 48-3a-302(1) of the 
Proposed Act permits such a statement of authority to designate authority of a 
specific person or by position or office (e.g., president, chief executive officer, 
etc.). A filed statement of authority will enable an LLC “to provide evidence of 
ongoing authority to enter into transactions without having to disclose to third 
parties the entirety of the operating agreement.”
135
 
By removing the outdated concept of statutory apparent authority by position, 
the Proposed Act provides greater management flexibility to adopt an almost 
infinite variety of management structures and determine which persons, positions, 
or offices have actual authority to bind the LLC. In addition, by providing for the 
filing of statements of authority, third parties will continue to have the convenience 
and ability to rely on filing evidence of authority. 
 
F.  The Proposed Act Contains a Default Governance Rule  
for Managers Missing from the Current Act 
 
The Proposed Act includes a default rule for how a vote of the managers 
decides matters. The Proposed Act provides that “any matter relating to the 
activities and affairs of the limited liability company is decided exclusively by the 
manager, or, if there is more than one manager, by a majority of the managers.”
136
 




G.  The Proposed Act Contains Foreclosure Provisions That Better Balance  
the Rights of Debtor-Members and Judgment Creditors 
 
Like the Current Act, the Proposed Act does not limit the remedy available to 
a member’s judgment creditor to only a charging order.
138
 Both the Current Act 
and the Proposed Act permit a court to foreclose on a charging order and sell the 
charged LLC interest.
139
 Accordingly, both statutes are more pro-creditor than 
those state LLC statutes that provide a charging order as the exclusive remedy. 
However, because the Proposed Act contains both a showing requirement
140
 and 
grants limited power to the court to make other orders giving effect to a charging 
order, the Proposed Act is more pro-business than the Current Act and better 
balances the rights of both debtor-members and judgment creditors. 
                                                 
134
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-302(1); see supra Part III.D. 
135
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 302(a)(2) cmt. 
136
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-407(3)(a). 
137
 See supra Part III.G. 
138
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(3); see supra Part III.E. 
139
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b) (West Supp. 2012); S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(3). 
140
 See supra Part III.E. 
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While the Current Act permits a court to foreclose at any time,
141
 the 
Proposed Act requires a showing by the judgment creditor “that distributions under 
a charging order will not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable time” before a 
court may foreclose and order the sale of the LLC interest.
142
 As noted above, 
requiring such a showing is a way for the court to balance the rights of the debtor-
member and the creditor and is more pro-business. Also, the Current Act grants the 
court broad discretionary powers to “make all other orders, directions, accounts, 
and inquiries a judgment debtor might make or that the circumstances of the case 
may require.”
143
 Such a broad grant of unfettered authority is an unwelcome 
invitation for the courts to meddle in the internal affairs of an LLC. In contrast, the 
Proposed Act’s grant of power to the court to make other orders is limited to 
“giv[ing] effect to the charging order.”
144
 This limited grant prevents the court 
from interfering in the internal affairs of the LLC. For example, if a judgment 
creditor who believes the LLC should invest less of its surplus in operations in 
order to leave more funds available for distributions has a charging order and 
makes a motion for a court order directing the LLC to restrict reinvestment, section 




Even though foreclosure is permitted under both the Proposed Act and the 
Current Act, because of the showing requirement and the limited grant of power to 
the court to make other orders to give effect to a charging order, the Proposed Act 
is more pro-business and better balances the rights of both the debtor-member and 
the judgment creditor. 
 
H.  The Proposed Act Does Not Penalize Member-Creditors  
and Winding-Up Creditors in Liquidation 
 
The Proposed Act eliminates both the member-creditor penalty and the 
winding-up-creditor penalty imposed by the Current Act wherein such creditors’ 
claims are subordinated.
146
 Instead, the Proposed Act simply provides that “[i]n 
winding up its activities, [an LLC] shall apply its assets to discharge its obligations 
to creditors, including members that are creditors.”
147
 The Proposed Act recognizes 
that no ordering or priority of the payment of creditor claims is necessary  





                                                 
141
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(2)(b). 
142
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(3); see supra Part III.E. 
143
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1103(1)(d) (emphasis added). 
144
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-503(2)(b). 
145
 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 503(b)(2) cmt (2006). 
146
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308(1); see supra Part III.B. 
147
 S.B. 21 § 48-3a-711(1). 
148
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308(1). 
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I.  The Proposed Act Contains Comprehensive Provisions for Mergers, Interest 
Exchanges, Conversions, and Domestications 
 
Unlike the Current Act, which deals only with conversions and mergers,
149
 the 
Proposed Act includes comprehensive provisions for mergers, interest exchanges, 
conversions, and domestications.
150
 Under the Proposed Act, a set of provisions 
governs each type of organic change. These provisions are not only internally 
consistent with one another, but are also consistent with the organic change 
provisions of the Utah-specific versions of the HRUPA and HULPA.
151
 
Also, the Proposed Act corrects a problem in the Current Act with respect to 
conversions. The Current Act inadequately deals with “outbound” conversions 
(i.e., the conversion of the Utah LLC into a foreign entity) in that it is unclear 
what, if anything, the LLC must file in Utah in connection with such a 
conversion.
152
 The confusion arises from the wording of section 48-2c-1406(4) of 
the Current Act, which states: 
 
(4) A conversion of a domestic [LLC] into a foreign subject entity  
must be: 
(a) permitted by the statutes governing the foreign subject entity; 
(b) approved in the manner required by the statutes described in 
Subsection (4)(a); and 
(c) accompanied by any filing in the foreign jurisdiction required by 




Nowhere in section 48-2c-1406(4) is a filing with a Utah governmental entity 
explicitly required. Instead, the wording provides that an outbound conversion 
must be “accompanied” by a filing in the foreign jurisdiction. Not only is the 
wording confusing, but it also seems to imply that the conversion only needs to 
have the filing required in the foreign jurisdiction and not in Utah. If this is the 
case, how is Utah to be informed of an outbound conversion when the only filing 
is the filing in the foreign jurisdiction? The author, when confronted with this exact 
issue involving the conversion of a Utah LLC into a Delaware LLC, raised the 
issue with Kathy Berg, the Director of the Utah Division of Corporations and 
Uniform Commercial Code. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Berg agreed to accept 
for filing a letter indicating that an outbound conversion had taken place when 
accompanied by a copy of the conversion filing from the foreign jurisdiction.
154
 
The organic transaction provisions of the Proposed Act not only eliminate the 
confusion found in the Current Act, but also provide clear and comprehensive 
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statutory guidance with respect to effecting such organic transactions and the 
resulting consequences thereof. 
 
J.  The Proposed Act Includes Enhanced Series LLC Provisions,  
Which Increase the Likelihood that Bankruptcy Courts and Nonseries Jurisdictions 
Will Respect a Series 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding series LLCs (“SLLCs”), the Proposed Act 
contains specific provisions not found in the Current Act that increase the 
likelihood that bankruptcy courts and nonseries jurisdictions will respect the 
existence of a series separate from the master LLC and each of the other series.
155
 
The SLLC is a form of LLC that partitions its assets and members into one or 
more separate “series” or “cells,” each of which can have separately designated 
members and managers and can own its own assets separately from the assets of 
the LLC or any other series. The liabilities of each series will be enforceable only 
against the assets of that series. Delaware enacted the first SLLC statute in 1996.
156
 
























) provide for a “series” of 
ownership interests but do not provide creditor protection as between each series. 
It is important to note that the drafters of the RULLCA considered but ultimately 
rejected the idea of including SLLC provisions in the RULLCA.
168
 The drafters 
noted conceptual concerns, bankruptcy issues, series treatment in states without 
SLLCs, tax treatment, and securities law issues.
169
 
Given the lack of judicial, statutory, and administrative guidance, several 
open issues continue to plague SLLCs, including uncertainties surrounding the 
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and the laws of nonseries jurisdictions.
173
 Most of the uncertainty surrounds 
whether bankruptcy courts and nonseries jurisdictions will respect the 
“separateness” of each series. In other words, will a series be treated as separate 
from the master LLC and each of the other series as to liabilities, purpose, power 
to sue or be sued, ownership of property, and otherwise, or will the existence of a 
series be disregarded? 
While the merits of having an SLLC statute in Utah are debatable, because the 
Current Act already has SLLC provisions,
174
 omitting SLLC provisions in the 
Proposed Act is not a viable option (i.e., the proverbial genie cannot be put back in 
the bottle). In light of the continuing uncertainty regarding SLLC, however, the 
Proposed Act’s SLLC provisions substantially improve those in the Current Act. 
Certain aspects of these provisions should be favorable factors in determining the 
“separateness” of each series and whether bankruptcy courts and non-SLLC states 
will respect liability protection of each series. 
The SLLC provisions in the Current Act,
175
 like those of Nevada, Oklahoma, 
and Kansas, closely follow the original Delaware statute. In contrast, the Illinois 
and Iowa
176
 SLLC provisions, while clearly influenced by the original Delaware 
statute, contain additional provisions that are designed to further the separateness 
of each series. It is these additional provisions that have been incorporated into the 
Proposed Act. 
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 One of the key uncertainties involves the classification and treatment of SLLCs 
under U.S. federal tax law. On September 14, 2010, the Internal Revenue Service 
attempted to address this particular area of uncertainty by issuing Proposed Treasury 
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 The uncertainty is whether the issuer of securities is only one particular series or 
instead the entire SLLC for purposes of registration, exemptions from registration, offering 
integration, and disclosure requirements of federal securities laws. 
172
 The uncertainty is how the bankruptcy courts will react to an SLLC when faced 
with the following issues: (i) whether a series may be a debtor for bankruptcy purposes and 
make a separate bankruptcy filing, and (ii) whether a bankruptcy court will uphold series 
liability shields. 
173
 The uncertainty is whether nonseries jurisdictions will recognize the series 
concept. 
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For example, unlike the other states, Illinois and Iowa explicitly define a 
series within an SLLC as a “separate [legal] entity.”
177
 This language separates 
Illinois and Iowa from the previous Delaware statute and its progenitors, including 
the Current Act, because the Illinois and Iowa LLC acts do not provide that each 
series is its own legal entity that is distinct from the original LLC. The Proposed 
Act includes a similar provision.
178
 
In addition, Illinois and Iowa provide that “the provisions of this [LLC] Act 
which are generally applicable to limited liability companies, their managers, 
members and transferees shall be applicable to each particular series.”
179
 This 
phrase is significant, and although absent from the original Delaware statute and 
the Current Act, it has been included in the Proposed Act.
180
 A court in a state 
without a series LLC statute may be more apt to treat the series like a simple LLC 
where, as in the Illinois and Iowa statutes and under the Proposed Act, the statute 
explicitly commands it. 
Also absent from the original Delaware statute and the Current Act is a 
provision similar to that found in the Illinois statute and the Proposed Act, which 
provides that each series is to be treated as a separate entity that may “contract, 
hold title to assets, grant security interests, sue and be sued and otherwise conduct 
business and exercise the powers of a limited liability company.”
181
 This omission 
from the Delaware statute led one commentator to believe that the statute simply 
provides a way to segregate assets, not to separately own them.
182
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In GxG Management LLC v. Young Brothers and Co.
183
—the first reported 
decision involving a Delaware SLLC—the court held that the statute did “not 
indicate what capacity an LLC has to pursue litigation on behalf of its series, . . . 
what capacity a series of an LLC has, if any, to pursue litigation on its own behalf, 
or . . . whether it should be regarded as an entity distinct from the LLC from which 
it is carved.”
184
 The court further noted, when denying a motion to amend 
judgment, that the relationship between a Delaware LLC and its series “merely 
[creates] a ‘series of interest’ maintained by the LLC.”
185
 
Following GxG Management, the Delaware legislature amended the LLC 
statute to rectify the belief that a series LLC only has an interest in (not ownership 
of) its assets.
186
 The new provision explicitly states that a series can hold title to 
assets in its own name.
187
 Furthermore, the capacity to sue and be sued, questioned 
by the court in GxG Management and other commentators, was clearly granted in 
the amended Delaware statute. Explicitly defining a series as a separate legal entity 
was not, however, added to the Delaware statute. 
Another significant addition in the Illinois LLC Act and Proposed Act is a 
provision providing for better notice to third parties that they are dealing with an 
SLLC. For example, the Illinois statute and the Proposed Act require the name of 
the series to contain the name of the SLLC and that it be distinguishable from the 
names of the other series.
188
 The Current Act has no such requirement. Therefore, 
if an SLLC includes the company name with the particular series behind it, a 
potential creditor performing reasonable due diligence should be on notice to 
inquire about a series and what makes a series different or separate from the main 
company name. 
While Delaware amended its statute to deal with some of the issues that 
commentators and the court in GxG Management exposed, Utah has not amended 
the Current Act. Accordingly, SLLCs under the Current Act are at a greater risk of 
losing series liability protection in bankruptcy and by non-SLLC states than 
SLLCs formed under or governed by the Proposed Act. 
The following Illinois-type provisions, which are absent in the Current Act, 
have been incorporated into the Proposed Act: (a) a series is to be treated as a 
“separate entity”;
189
 (b) a series has “the power and capacity, in its own name, to 
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hold property and sue and be sued”;
190
 (c) “the provisions of [the Proposed Act] 
which are generally applicable to [LLCs], and its managers, members and 
transferees, shall be applicable to each series”;
191
 and (d) a requirement that “[t]he 
name of each series must contain the name of the [SLLC] and be distinguishable 
from the name of any other series.”
192
 Even with these clarifying provisions in the 
Proposed Act, significant uncertainty will continue regarding SLLCs for the 
foreseeable future. However, the incorporation of these Illinois-type provisions 
into the Proposed Act should assist bankruptcy courts and non-SLLC states in 
determining whether to respect the separate existence, including liability 
protection, of each series. 
 
K.  The Proposed Act Includes Low-Profit LLCs 
 
The low-profit LLC provisions from the Current Act
193
 are incorporated into 




L.  The Proposed Act Eliminates Default Rules for Profit and Loss Allocations 
 
The Proposed Act eliminates the use of the tax term “capital account” and the 
default rules regarding profit and loss allocations used in the Current Act.
195
 The 
Proposed Act recognizes that there are scenarios where a capital account for 
federal income tax purposes will be different than a capital account determined 
under the default rules of the Current Act. The Proposed Act also recognizes that 
federal tax laws will ultimately determine a member’s share of profits and losses 
for tax purposes. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Proposed Act offers a number of advantages over the Current Act. The 
Current Act is an outdated one-of-a-kind statute that is a patchwork of other 
commercial statutes that do not mesh well. It has significant inconsistencies and is 
decidedly less business-friendly than the Proposed Act. It is time for the Utah 
legislature to enact an LLC statute that (1) represents the best thinking of some of 
the nation’s foremost experts on LLCs and LLC legislation, (2) is drafted while 
taking into account recent developments and national trends, (3) offers the benefits 
of uniformity and consistency with Utah’s other unincorporated business entity 
statutes as well as with other states’ unincorporated business entity statutes, and 
(4) conveys the message that Utah is a pro-business state. 
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